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FEDERAL EQUITABLE RESTRAINT: A YOUNGER
ANALYSIS IN NEW SETTINGs
The doctrine of Younger v. Harris' limits the availability of federal
relief sought by individuals facing prosecutions under allegedly unconstitutional state statutes by requiring a federal court to refrain from granting
equitable relief against pending state prosecutions 2 absent certain extraordinary circumstances. 3 However, if no state prosecution is pending
against a federal complainant, the principles of comity and equity espoused
4
by Younger do not require a federal court to exercise equitable restraint.
The availability of federal relief, therefore, may depend in large part upon
the determination of the pendency of a state prosecution.
Standards for determining when a state criminal prosecution is
pending so as to limit federal relief from allegedly unconstitutional state
statutes have not been fully specified by the Supreme Court. Two cases
decided during the October Term, 1974, Hicks v. Miranda5 and Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd.,6 assist in defining the term "pending state prosecutions."
Hicks held that before proceedings of substance on the merits in federal
court have begun, Younger will apply even though the federal complaint
was filed before the initiation of a state prosecution ;7 Huffman held that
Younger applied to limit federal intervention in state proceedings8 in
1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. The federal complainant in Younger sought injunctive but not declaratory
relief; hence, the holding in that case is limited to the proposition that a federal
court may not grant an injunction against a pending state prosecution absent
extraordinary circumstances. 401 U.S. at 53-54. In the companion case of Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), the Court applied the principles developed in Younger
to preclude federal declaratory relief from pending state prosecutions. 401 U.S. at 73.
3. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971). For a discussion of the
"extraordinary circumstances" which constitute exceptions to the Younger doctrine
see note 29 infra.
4. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974), held that federal declaratory
relief is not precluded by the Younger doctrine where no state prosecution is pending
and there is a genuine threat of enforcement of the challenged state statute.
Recently, the Court extended the principles of Steffel to hold that a preliminary
injunction against future prosecutions was not subject to the Younger restrictions.
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975) ; see note 43 infra.
The rationale advanced for not denying federal equitable relief when no state
prosecution is pending is that "the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism
'have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.'" Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974), quoting from Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406
U.S. 498, 509 (1972).
5. 422 U.S.332 (1975).
6. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
7. 422 U.S. at 349.
8. Huffman involved a public nuisance statute under which a state civil proceeding closely resembling a criminal prosecution was pending. The Court held that
Younger principles applied in full to limit federal intervention in such state proceedings. 420 U.S. at 603-07. For further discussion of this portion of the Huffman
decision see notes 67-70 and accompanying text infra.
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which state appellate remedies had not been exhausted.9 Thus, the Hicks
holding may aid in determining whether a state criminal proceeding
which has not reached judgment is "pending" for purposes of applying
Younger, while Huffman indicates that a state proceeding may still be
"pending" even after the state judgment has been rendered. 10
These two cases further contract the availability of federal relief from
enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state statutes. This Comment
examines the law leading up to these cases and the cases themselves. An
analysis of Hicks and Huffman, both under the Younger doctrine and
in light of the doctrine of Monroe v. Pape" - that exhaustion of state
administrative or judicial remedies is not required before a federal suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 198312 can be maintained 13 - leads to the conclusion
that neither Hicks nor Huffman should be read as a mechanical test to
undermine the duty of a federal court carefully to balance state and federal
interests under Younger when determining the propriety of federal intervention in state proceedings.
THE PRIOR LAW

Federal policies restricting intervention in state criminal proceedings
are founded in traditional equitable doctrines. 14 Under the test for determining the propriety of federal intervention in state prosecutions formulated by the Supreme Court, 15 it must be shown that there exists
threatened injury greater than that incidental to the defense of any good
faith criminal prosecution, and that a federal court can offer protection not
available through the conventional state process and possible review by
the Supreme Court. Hence, federal intervention normally will be inappropriate since state prosecutions generally afford an adequate remedy
9. 420 U.S. at 609.
10. Application of Younger where federal relief is sought after completion of

a state proceeding as to which the losing litigant did not exhaust state appellate
remedies may produce harsh results. The Huffman Court implied that even if failure to
make a timely appeal were to foreclose all state appellate remedies, Younger principles
would apply to bar federal equitable relief as well. 420 U.S. at 611 n.22; see note 80
and accompanying text infra. But cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963),
where the Court held that a federal habeas corpus applicant need exhaust only those
state remedies still available at the time an application in federal court is filed.
11. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
12. See note 72 infra.
13. See text accompanying note 132 infra.
14. See, e.g., Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Fenner
v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926). Both cases required extraordinary circumstances
threatening great and immediate irreparable loss as a prerequisite to federal injunctions against state prosecutions; the Penner Court noted that "[an intolerable condition would arise, if, whenever about to be charged with violating a state law, one
were permitted freely to contest its validity by an original proceeding in some federal
court." 271 U.S. at 244.
15. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943).
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at law and threaten only that injury incidental to any criminal prosecution. 16
Notions of comity, involving a balancing of federal interest in safeguarding constitutionally guaranteed rights against state interest in enforcing state laws, likewise restrict federal interference with state
prosecutions. 17 Comity requires a close examination of the state interests
involved, the federal rights imperiled, the gravity of the threat to federal
rights, and the abilities of state and federal courts to provide adequate
relief. 18 Comity is often realized through abstention, which requires a
federal court having proper jurisdiction to abstain from the exercise of
that jurisdiction in deference to a state court, giving the state court an
16. Behind the reluctance of federal equity courts to intervene in state prosecutions is a concern for avoiding interference with ongoing criminal proceedings.
Justice Frankfurter recognized the powerful tradition involved: "The maxim that
equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution summarizes centuries of weighty experience in Anglo-American law." Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
17. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
96-100 (1973); Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings:
The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 535, 541-43 (1970).
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), Justice Black described comity
in a federal system as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.
An assumption basic to maintaining the proper federal-state balance articulated in
the cases presently under consideration is that state courts will protect and vindicate
federal rights, for otherwise federal deference to state courts would be unjustified on
equitable principles because an adequate state remedy at law would be absent. See
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Note, The Federal AntiInjunction Statute and Declaratory Judgments in Constitutional Litigation, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 1870, 1873 (1970).
18. Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski,
Younger, and Beyond, 50 TEXAS L. Rtv. 1324, 1338-48 (1972). To the extent
state proceedings protect federal rights, the need for federal intervention dissipates.
The customary respect due an individual's choice of a federal forum in a system
of concurrent jurisdiction, see Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967), and the
role of federal courts as primary vindicators of constitutional rights, see Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974), generally support federal intervention; however,
"[w]hile the protective role of the federal courts always weighs in favor of federal
intervention, another federal interest - the interest in avoiding unnecessary federal
constitutional decisions - frequently weighs against it." Maraist, Federal Intervention,
supra at 1338.
The anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), provides a legislative
expression of principles of comity, operating in conjunction with comity rather than
being merely a restatement of the judicial doctrine. Cf. Mitchell v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 243 (1972). While section 2283 is mandatory in its prohibition of federal
injunctions where applicable, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) ; Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 US. 281, 286-87 (1970),
comity is also achieved through judicial discretion in those cases where section 2283
does not apply.
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opportunity to resolve underlying issues of state law. 19 When applicable,
abstention requires that a federal court avoid resolution of federal constitutional questions until the state court has had an opportunity to dispose
20
of the controversy on threshold state law grounds.
The Supreme Court reassessed federal abstention in Dombrowski
v. Pfister.2 1 Holding the challenged statutes void as overbroad abridgments
of first amendment rights, 22 the Court felt that abstention was inappropriate
for two reasons: allegations were made that state officials had invoked
the statutes in bad faith to harass the complainants and to discourage
the exercise of protected freedoms, 23 and the statutes were attacked on
19. See
WECHSLER's
[hereinafter
196-208 (2d

generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART &
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 988-97 (2d ed. 1973)
cited as HART & WECHSLER]; C.A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
ed. 1970); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the

Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974). There are several
distinguishable abstention doctrines, the most significant being that derived from the
seminal case of Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See WRIGHT,
supra at 196-97.
There are two basic sources of abstention. Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief,
supra note 17, at 538. First, to preserve harmonious federal-state relations necessary
to our federal system, comity demands federal deference to state sovereignty
wherever possible. Second, the federal policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional
decisions, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ; see generally Field, Abstention, supra at 1096-1101, impels federal
abstention; the traditional notion is that if the state court were to invalidate the
state action under state law, there would be no need to decide the federal constitutional
question. See WRIGHT, supra at 197.
20. An obvious case for abstention is that of an as yet unconstrued state
statute that is susceptible of a construction which would render unnecessary a resolution of the constitutional challenge. In such a case, abstention allows state interpretation, thereby avoiding possible conflicting constructions, unwanted federal-state friction,
and premature decision of constitutional issues. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 93 (1973).
Abstention is inappropriate where a state statute would be unconstitutional
under any state court construction. Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35
(1965) ; Baggett v Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-79 (1964)
(abstention improper
where state construction would not avoid the constitutional issue of vagueness); cf.
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967) ("We have frequently emphasized
that abstention is not to be ordered unless the state statute is of an uncertain nature,
and is obviously susceptible of a limiting construction.").
21. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). In Dombrowski no state prosecutions were actually
pending against the federal complainants. Earlier charges has been dismissed, and
prosecution under later indictments was awaiting the outcome of the federal action.
Id. at 487-88.
22. Id. at 497.
23. Id. at 490. Considerations of comity do not preclude federal relief against
bad faith prosecutions. See, e.g., Duncan v. Perez, 321 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La.),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971). The need to protect the significant right to
freedom of expression and the absence of a countervailing state interest in bad faith
enforcement of state laws weigh heavily in favor of federal intervention. A showing
of bad faith prosecution constitutes injury additional to that which is incidental to a
good faith state proceeding and therefore satisfies the irreparable injury requirement
of Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943). See text at note 16

1976]

FEDERAL EQUITABLE RESTRAINT

their faces as overbroad infringements of first amendment freedoms. 24 The
implication of the second basis for the Court's refusal to abstain was that
the chilling effect 25 on the exercise of first amendment rights produced

by a facially vague or overbroad statute constitutes irreparable harm
26
sufficient to require federal equitable intervention.
In a group of cases known as the Younger sextet, 27 decided during
the 1970 Term, the Supreme Court examined the sufficiency of chilling
effect alone as a ground for federal equitable intervention. Noting the
supra. In Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 621 (1968), the Court indicated that
to establish bad faith a complainant must show that prosecutions had been brought
without expectation of conviction and solely to discourage the exercise of protected
activity.
The Dombrowski Court's willingness to permit federal intervention is explicable
on traditional grounds: the presence of bad faith prosecution constituted irreparable
injury, see 380 U.S. at 489-90; allegations of threats of prosecutions under statutes
other than those supporting existing indictments meant that immediate state resolution of all constitutional issues was improbable, see id. at 489; and it was unlikely
that an acceptable limiting construction of the allegedly vague statutory provisions
could be attained in a solitary state prosecution, see id. at 491-92. As one commentator observed in regard to Dombrowski: "The formulations are new but the
result is not. It has been well established that abstention is improper if the state
statute is unconstitutional regardless of the construction the state court might give it."
WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 207 (footnotes omitted).
24. 380 U.S. at 490-91.
25. The chilling effect doctrine is a recent addition to constitutional law theory
designed to protect the exercise of constitutional freedoms from unwarranted limitation
generated by facially vague or overbroad laws. See Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307, 344-45 (1967) (Brennan, J.,dissenting). See generally Note, The
Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUm. L. REV. 808 (1969).

A "vague"

statute is imprecise in delineating the scope of conduct regulated, and is therefore
susceptible to several interpretations, some of which may infringe upon constitutionally protected conduct; an "overbroad" statute is clear in describing the conduct regulated, but includes within its coverage constitutionally protected activity.
Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REV. 38, 301 n.7 (1971). The
Supreme Court has used chilling effect arguments to develop the doctrine that only
by precise and sufficiently narrow statutes may freedom of expression be constitutionally regulated. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
The chilling effect resulting from an unconstitutionally overbroad state statute
presents a stronger argument for federal intervention in state prosecutions than does
that resulting from an unconstitutionally vague statute. When a statute is challenged
for vagueness, two substantial policies limit federal intervention: the interest of a
state in construing its own laws to regulate only those activities that are not
constitutionally protected and the policy of avoiding unnecessary federal constitutional
decisions. When a statute is attacked as overbroad, no limiting state construction is
possible and a decision on the constitutional question cannot be avoided. See
Maraist, Federal Intervention, supra note 18, at 1344-46; Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 250-52 (1967) (no limiting construction of overbroad statute conceivable;
federal abstention inappropriate since chilling of protected freedom would result).
26. 380 U.S. at 490-92.
27. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82
(1971) ; Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401
U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 35

roles of equity and comity, "the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state
criminal prosecutions," 28 the Court held in Younger v. Harris that an
allegation of chilling effect from facially vague or overbroad state statutes
will not, by itself, support federal equitable intervention in pending state
prosecutions.2 9 In the companion case of Samuels v. Mackel 30 the Court
28. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
29. Id. at 53-54. The holding in Younger is that an allegation of facial unconstitutionality does not in itself justify a federal injunction against pending enforcement of a state statute absent bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 54. Thus, even when a state prosecution is pending, federal intervention may be justified in certain instances. Bad faith prosecution, as discussed in
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1965), is the most frequent "extraordinary circumstance." See note 23 supra. Other circumstances justifying federal
intervention as enumerated in Younger are a "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional
state statute, see Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941) ; Sendak v. Nihiser, 44
U.S.L.W. 3297, 3298 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (dissenting opinion), and a defense
to a single state prosecution that is insufficient to vindicate endangered federal
rights. See 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54.
In Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the
district court erred in finding bad faith and harassment. 422 U.S. at 350. Since the
seizure of allegedly obscene films had been supported by judicial order, the Court
concluded that official bad faith could not be inferred even if the district court were
correct in concluding that the challenged statute was unconstitutional; otherwise bad
faith would always exist if a state statute were held unconstitutional "and the rule
of Younger v. Harris would be swallowed up by its exception." 422 U.S. at 352;
cf. Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427, 434-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 122 (1975) (neither lapse of time nor expectation of lack of success on
constitutional questions at state level constitutes an exception to Younger principles).
The Court further explained "extraordinary circumstances" in Kugler v.
Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975) (footnote omitted):
The very nature of "extraordinary circumstances," of course, makes it impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient
threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in state criminal proceedings. But whatever else is required, such
circumstances must be "extraordinary" in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely
in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation.
In Helfant a New Jersey municipal court judge, facing an indictment for obstruction
of justice and false swearing, alleged coercion and harassment by the New Jersey
Supreme Court and the impossibility of obtaining a fair review by that Court if convicted of the state charges. Concluding that the New Jersey judicial system provided
adequate safeguards to prevent a denial of due process in the state appellate process
and noting that by the time of its decision different judges were sitting on the
New Jersey Supreme Court, the Court held that the claim that a fair trial could not
be received in the state court system was without foundation and the facts did
not, therefore, come within any exception to Younger. 421 U.S. at 130-31; ef.
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951) (federal courts should not intervene in
state prosecutions to suppress the use of evidence allegedly secured by unlawful
search and seizure). But cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (incompetency
of state agency to adjudicate pending issues made Younger dismissal inappropriate).
30. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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stated that the standards for declaratory relief were no less rigid than those
for injunctive relief; thus, a declaratory judgment generally should not
issue when a state prosecution is pending.81
While Younger and Samuels established that a federal court normally
should refrain from considering the merits of requests for injunctive or
declaratory relief from pending state prosecutions,3 2 neither case decided
whether federal relief would be proper in the absence of a pending state
prosecution.83 This issue was addressed in Steffel v. Thompson.34 The
31. Id. at 72-73. Looking to the practical effects of injunctive or declaratory
relief, Justice Black said: "[0]rdinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid." Id. at 72. But cf.
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (affirmation of a grant of declaratory relief
where injunctive relief denied) ; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-55
(1963) (request for declaratory relief from state statute does not require convening
of three-judge court as would a request for injunctive relief).
Justice Brennan examined the equation of injunctive and declaratory relief in
a lengthy opinion in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971) (concurring in part
and dissenting in part). He concluded that a declaratory judgment was intended
by Congress as a less intrusive alternative to injunctive relief, the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970), having arisen in part from congressional
antipathy toward federal court use of injunctions, see 401 U.S. at 111-15, and that
irreparable injury was not prerequisite to declaratory relief: "Congress expressly
rejected that limitation and to engraft it upon the availability of the congressionally
provided declaratory remedy is simply judicial defiance of the congressional mandate." Id. at 116. Justice Brennan also expressed his belief that federal intervention
is appropriate when no state prosecution is pending, and opined that the milder
and less intrusive nature of declaratory relief makes it suitable to vindicate constitutional rights endangered by threatened state prosecutions. Id. at 130.
Samuels was expressly limited to the situation of a pending state prosecution.
401 U.S. at 73-74. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the Court adopted
the position taken by Justice Brennan in Perez and rejected the application of
Samuels when no prosecution was pending. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text
infra.
32. The doctrine articulated in Younger and Samuels is distinct from abstention.
Abstention requires federal court deference to state courts for resolution of issues
of state law; jurisdiction is retained by the federal court for later disposition of the
federal constitutional issues should that prove necessary. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964) (reservation of federal claims in state court preserves
them from the binding effect of a state adjudication) ; cf. Harris County Comm'rs
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 n.14 (1975). Under the Younger doctrine of
equitable restraint, the federal court will dismiss the federal action, allowing a
state court to decide the federal constitutional claim when it is raised as a defense
to a state prosecution.
33. The Court in both Younger and Samuels expressly reserved the question
whether federal courts could properly grant injunctive or declaratory relief when no
state proceedings were pending. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) ; Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1971).
34. 415 U.S. 452 (1974). Two years before the decision in Steffel, Justice
Brennan indicated in Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972), that

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 35

petitioner in Steffel was twice threatened with arrest for distributing
handbills protesting American involvement in Vietnam.3 5 He brought a
federal action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from threatened
prosecution. The district court dismissed the claims as inappropriate for
federal relief ;36 upon Steffel's appeal from the denial of declaratory relief,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 7 A
unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal declaratory relief
is appropriate if no state prosecution is pending and a genuine threat of
enforcement of the challenged statute is demonstrated. 3
There were two primary bases for the Steffel Court's conclusion that
declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending."39
First, federal declaratory relief involves less intrusion into a state's administration of its criminal laws and was intended by Congress to be
available on a less rigid basis than injunctive relief. 40 The milder relief
afforded by a declaratory judgment was thus deemed appropriate in the
absence of a state prosecution regardless of whether injunctive relief
would be available. 41 Second, the Court observed that while traditional
considerations would preclude injunctive or declaratory relief from an
ongoing state prosecution, "the relevant principles of equity, comity, and
he believed federal relief would be permissible in the absence of a pending state
prosecution since considerations of equity and comity would then be of less significance. 406 U.S. at 509.
35. 415 U.S. at 455-56. On both occasions Steffel left in order to avoid arrest.
A companion of Steffel's was arrested and later arraigned when she continued
handbilling; her state trial was stayed pending the outcome of Steffel's action. Id.
at 455-56 n.3. A threshold consideration in Steffel was the presence of an actual
and continuing controversy, since prosecution was only threatened, not pending. The
Court concluded that real threats of prosecution created a justiciable controversy,
but remanded for determination whether the controversy was currently extant. Id.
at 458-60.
36. Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
37. Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972). Although the petitioner
had sought declaratory and injunctive relief and his companion had sought to enjoin
her pending prosecution, all of which was denied by the district court, only Steffel
appealed, and ultimately only from the denial of declaratory relief. Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 456 nn.5&6 (1974).
38. 415 U.S. at 475.
39. In Steffel the challenge was to a state statute as applied. The Court held
that federal declaratory relief from threatened prosecution was available whether a
state statute was challenged on its face or as applied. Id. at 473-75; see The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 205 n.13 (1974).
40. 415 U.S. at 468-71. The Steffel Court drew heavily from Justice Brennan's
opinion in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41. 415 U.S. at 475; see note 31 supra.
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federalism 'have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.' ",42
Access to federal declaratory relief therefore was made dependent upon
an initial determination of the pendency of a state proceeding.4 3 The
Court did not specify, however, either in Steffel or in earlier cases, at
what point in the federal litigation the determination of the pendency of
44
state proceedings must be made.
42. 415 U.S. at 462, quoting from Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S.
498, 509 (1972).
43. Since Steffel involved only a request for declaratory relief, the Court did
not consider the propriety of federal injunctive relief in the absence of a pending
state prosecution. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the Court
affirmed a grant of preliminary injunctions to federal plaintiffs who were not facing
pending state prosecutions, holding that absent such a prosecution "the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is not subject to the restrictions of Younger." Id. at 930.
The holding in Salem Inn was simply that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction. Id. at 934. The Court noted that the
question was close, but concluded that under the traditional standards for granting
a preliminary injunction, and given the limited nature of appellate review, the district
court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 931-32. Salem Inn does establish that when
preliminary injunctive relief is sought and no state proceeding is pending against
the federal plaintiff, the propriety of such relief is to be determined without consideration of the Younger doctrine. While neither Salem Inn nor any other Supreme
Court decision clearly indicates whether a request for permanent injunctive relief
should likewise be viewed without regard to Younger when no state proceeding is
pending, it would seem that the Younger considerations of equity and comity would
not preclude permanent injunctive relief. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
462-63 (1974) ; Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972). However, as the Court observed in Salem Inn, where a state statute is found unconstitutional by the district court, the rights of parties not facing pending prosecutions can
normally be protected by the issuance of a declaratory judgment rather than a more
intrusive injunction. See 422 U.S. at 931.
44. Justices White and Rehnquist addressed this issue in concurring opinions
in Steffel. Justice White felt that a state prosecution filed subsequent to the commencement of a federal suit might not force dismissal of the federal action if the
latter had progressed sufficiently to raise considerations of judicial economy. 415
U.S. at 478. For Justice Rehnquist, any state proceeding prior to resolution of the
federal action would seem to preclude federal relief. 415 U.S. at 480; cf. Allee v.
Medrango, 416 U.S. 802, 816-20 (1974) (appearing to indicate that Younger applies
if prosecutions are pending at the time of the federal court decision).
In Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White and Marshall, stated that "[tihe availability of declaratory relief was correctly
regarded to depend upon the situation at the time of the hearing and not upon the
situation when the federal suit was initiated." 401 U.S. at 103 (concurring in part and
dissenting in part). But see 401 U.S. at 130 (Justice Brennan determining pendency
as of the time federal jurisdiction attaches) ; Comment, Federal Declaratory Relief
and the Non-Pending State Criminal Suit, 34 MD. L. Rav. 87, 92 n.27 (1974) (discussing the apparent inconsistency in Justice Brennan's approach in Perez) ; Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454 (1974) (Justice Brennan using date of filing).
Some lower federal courts have determined pendency as of the time the federal
complain is filed. See, e.g., Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F2d 18, 21-23 (2d Cir.
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922 (1975); Jones v. Wade, 479 F.2d 1176, 1181 n.6 (5th Cir. 1973);
Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76, 78-79 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 35

THE Hicks AND Huffman DECISIONS

In Hicks v. Miranda45 the Supreme Court held that the principles
of Younger applied to require dismissal of a federal action where state
proceedings against the federal plaintiffs were initiated subsequent to
filing of the federal complaint. State criminal misdemeanor charges had
been filed against theater employees 48 for showing an allegedly obscene
film. A state court, after a show cause order, declared the film obscene
and ordered all copies seized. 47 Immediately thereafter, a federal suit was
48
initiated by the theater owners seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
Seven weeks later, but just one day after service of the federal complaint,
the state criminal complaint was amended, naming the federal plaintiffs as
49
additional parties defendant.
In this posture the Supreme Court held that the district court erred
in reaching the merits of the federal case. The Court first concluded that
the federal plaintiffs did, in fact, have a state proceeding available in which
to litigate fully their claims when they filed in federal court. 50 This determination was based on the "substantial stake" that the plaintiffs had in
the state proceedings pending against the theater employees and the
51
"intertwining" of plaintiffs' interests with those of their employees.
981 (1973). This test has been criticized as promoting a "race to the courthouse."
See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 25, at 308-09 (1971); Comment,
Federal Declaratory Relief, supra at 119-21.
A test which determines the pendency of a state prosecution as of the date
of the federal hearing ignores the inefficiency of requiring dismissal of a federal
action which has progressed significantly towards decision. See Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 478 (1974) (White, J., concurring). Commentators have proposed
more complex tests designed to allow response to the specific federal and state interests
at stake. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 25, at 309-10; Comment,
Federal Declaratory Relief, supra at 119-21.
45. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
46. Id. at 335. The theater employees originally charged in the state criminal
proceeding were not parties to the later federal action.
47. Id. at 335-36. No appeal was taken from the order of the state court. The
Supreme Court noted that this failure to appeal might itself preclude federal relief.
Id. at 351 n.20; see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 n.22 (1975).
48. 422 U.S. at 337. A temporary restraining order was requested and denied by
a single district judge. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1970) to consider the constitutionality of the state statute and the injunctive
relief sought. This court declared the statute unconstitutional and issued appropriate
relief. Id. at 340-42. The Supreme Court was initially faced with the issue of its
jurisdiction to hear the direct appeal of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), and
concluded that both the injunction and the declaratory judgment issued by the
three-judge district court were properly before it. Id. at 348.
49. Id. at 339.
50. Id. at 348-49.
51. Id. at 348. The Court imposed the burden upon the plaintiffs, whose
lawyers also represented the theater employees, to show clearly that they could not
present and fully litigate all their claims in the state proceedings. Absent such a
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Hicks therefore indicates that there may be situations where Younger
principles are applicable even though no state proceedings are pending
against the particular federal plaintiffs, if there are proceedings pending
against others having a sufficient identity of interest with them.5 2 Notwithstanding this basis for requiring dismissal of the federal action, the
Hicks Court went on to address the issue of the pendency of state proceedings against the federal plaintiffs themselves, holding
[t]hat where state criminal proceedings are begun against the
federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before
showing, Younger principles applied to restrict federal interference with these
pending state court proceedings Id. at 349. One clear instance where legally
distinct state defendants would not adequately represent the interests of federal
plaintiffs to whom they are closely related would be where the state defendants
simply pled guilty to the state charges. The Court's treatment leaves unresolved the

question whether a section 1983 plaintiff must always affirmatively demonstrate that
there is no state proceeding in which to litigate his federal claims, or whether the
state has the burden of raising the issue, leaving the ultimate burden on the plaintiff
to show that the state proceeding does not provide for sufficient representation of his
interests.
52. This portion of the Hicks decision is supported by the Court's language
in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975). In Salem Inn one corporate
federal plaintiff had a state prosecution, initiated one day after filing of the federal
complaint, pending against it, while two others did not. The Court determined that
each federal plaintiff should have its request for relief decided independently of other
plaintiffs' entitlement to relief. 422 U.S. at 928-29. However, the Court observed
that while Salem Inn was not such a case, there might be cases where "legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them .... " Id. at 928. But cfi. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), where a state prosecution against a federal plaintiff (who
did not appeal the district court decision) was stayed by the state pending a decision
in the federal case.
Neither Hicks nor Salem Inn explained precisely what will constitute a sufficient identity of interest to ensure that the interests of a federal complainant are
adequately represented in state proceedings pending against others. The Salem Inn
plaintiffs had similar business interests and were represented by common counsel;
the crucial factor for the Court was that they were "unrelated in terms of ownership, control and management." 422 U.S. at 929. In Hicks the interests of the
employers and their employees were observed to be "intertwined" and common
counsel represented both groups. While the Salem Inn Court determined that there
was not an identity of interest sufficient to make all plaintiffs subject to the Younger
principles governing one of them, the Hicks Court found that the employers' interests
could have been protected in the state proceedings pending against their employees.
The status of employee-employer in Hicks, therefore, would appear to supply the
relationship missing in Salem Inn. The Court's treatment of this problem seems
less than adequate when viewed in light of the basic nature of the Younger doctrine.
The interests of employees facing state prosecutions, and therefore the possibility of
conviction and consequent punishment, are not necessarily substantially identical to
those of their employers. And even assuming that the employee-employer relationship
creates an "identity of interest," the fact that the state proceeding is not pending
against the federal plaintiff is a factor which is relevant to the careful balancing of
interests required under Younger.
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any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in
the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply
in full force. 53
This holding significantly limits access to federal relief from applications
of allegedly unconstitutional state statutes. While one faced with a
threatened state prosecution may seek federal relief under Steffel,54 that
relief will be precluded if the state initiates a good faith prosecution at
any time before there have been "proceedings of substance on the merits"
in federal court.
As observed by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion, the meaning
of the standard "proceedings of substance on the merits" is not altogether
clear. 55 It is not apparent from Hicks exactly what combination of federal
proceedings "of substance" and "on the merits" is required before Younger
principles will apply to curtail federal intervention in a state proceeding
begun subsequent to the federal action. Some definition can be gleaned
from the facts in Hicks, where considerable federal court activity had
transpired in the seven weeks between filing of the federal action and the
addition of the federal plaintiffs as defendants in the state complaint. 56
Hicks indicates that a hearing by a single federal judge on a request for
a temporary restraining order, the designation of a three-judge district
court, the filing of answers and motions, and the submission of several
briefs and affidavits do not, in combination, amount to proceedings of
57
substance on the merits.
53. 422 U.S. at 349. In Hicks the Court applied Younger to require dismissal
of the federal action. Id. at 350. Although the district court had concluded that
official harassment and bad faith were present, the Court held that constant judicial
authorization for the actions of prosecutorial officials indicated that no bad faith
exception to Younger had been established. Id. at 351.
54. While Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), held that federal declaratory relief is not precluded absent a pending state prosecution, and Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), extended Steffel to permit a federal preliminary
injunction, it remains uncertain whether permanent federal injunctive relief would be
available if no state prosecution were pending. See note 43 supra. Regardless of the
type of federal equitable relief sought, application of Younger principles where a
state prosecution is initiated prior to federal proceedings of substance would bar
federal intervention absent extraordinary circumstances, because Younger and its
companion case, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), preclude federal injunctive
or declaratory relief against pending state proceedings.
55. 422 U.S. at 353-54 n.1.
56. Id. at 338-39.
57. The proceedings in federal court in Hicks, although not sufficient to meet
the test the Court formulated, did involve seven weeks of trial preparation. In
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), a state prosecution was commenced
against one of the federal plaintiffs one day after the federal suit was filed. The
Court found federal relief inappropriate: "[T]he federal litigation was in an
embryonic stage and no contested matter had been decided. In this posture, [the
plaintiff's] prayer for injunction is squarely governed by Younger." 422 U.S.
at 929. Since the only federal court activity preceding the initiation of the state
prosecution in Salem Inn was the filing of the federal complaint, the decision offers
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While dismissal of the federal action is required under the facts
in Hicks,5 s the decision does not expressly condone federal intervention
whenever federal proceedings of substance on the merits have preceded
the initiation of a state prosecution. It would seem that there may be
situations in which dismissal of the federal complaint would be within
the district court's discretion despite considerable federal proceedings in
advance of a state prosecution. The propriety of federal intervention is
determined by weighing federal interests in protecting individual rights
against the federal court's duty to respect state interests under notions
of comity ;59 the resulting balance may still dictate that a federal court
refrain from intervention in state proceedings begun after considerable
federal court proceedings. The more substantial the federal proceedings
have been, however, the more considerations of judicial economy would
appear to affect the Younger60 balance in favor of permitting the federal
action to proceed to decision.
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.6 ' the Supreme Court considered the

propriety of federal equitable relief when a state court judgment had been
issued prior to filing of the federal complaint. Proceedings under an Ohio
public nuisance statute 62 had been instituted against the federal comno aid in determining the precise meaning of "proceedings of substance on the
merits."
58. Hicks involved state criminal proceedings, and the Court's holding is
limited to criminal prosecutions. 422 U.S. at 348. Given the extension of Younger
principles in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), to include cases of pending
quasi-criminal state proceedings, it would appear likely that the concept proposed in
Hicks would be equally applicable if state quasi-criminal proceedings were commenced prior to any proceedings of substance on the merits in a federal action.
Such was the fear expressed by Justice Stewart in his dissent. 422 U.S. at 357.
His additional concern that the filing of any state civil action might someday
suffice to require dismissal of federal action is as yet purely speculative.
59. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
60. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the Court discussed
in another context the weight to be given the interest in efficient judicial administration. In determining that a federal plaintiff not facing a pending state prosecution
must have its request for federal relief considered separately from other plaintiffs
facing state prosecutions, the Court noted that "the interest of avoiding conflicting
outcomes in the litigation of similar issues . . . must of necessity be subordinated to
the claims of federalism in this particular area of the law." 422 U.S. at 928. The
Court proceeded to discuss the interest in conserving judicial manpower, concluding
that occasional duplication in similar cases is unavoidable in a federal, as opposed
to a unitary, system. Id. While this is also true in settings such as that presented
by Hicks, interest in avoiding duplicative proceedings and waste of judicial time is a
relevant factor to be weighed in attempting to achieve the balance of state and
federal interests demanded by comity. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text
intra.

61. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
62. OHIo RV. CODE ANN. § 3767.01-.99 (Page 1971).
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plainant's predecessor in interest for exhibiting allegedly obscene films. 63
A judgment closing the theater and providing for the seizure and sale of
property used in theater operations was rendered. 64 When Pursue succeeded to the leasehold interest in the theater, it filed a federal action
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief rather than appealing the judgment in the state courts. 65 A three-judge district court, apparently without
considering the applicability of Younger, found the Ohio nuisance statute
unconstitutionally overbroad and enjoined the execution of a portion of the
state court order.06
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Younger principles applied to federal complainants seeking relief against proceedings instituted
under the Ohio nuisance statute. 67 The Court concluded that federal
interference with this state civil proceeding would offend a significant
state interest in the nuisance litigation and disrupt state attempts to protect
interests and enforce standards essentially equivalent to those found in
criminal laws.6 s Both the express language 69 and the rationale of Huffman
63. Section 3767.01(C) of the Ohio statute defines "nuisance" as including a
place where obscene films are exhibited.
64. 420 U.S. at 598. The state court judgment was that Pursue's predecessor
in interest "had engaged in a course of conduct of displaying obscene movies . . .
and that the theater was therefore to be closed . . . 'for any purpose for a period of
one year unless sooner released by Order of [the] Court .

. . .'"

Id.

In addition,

provision was made pursuant to section 3767.06 of the statute for the seizure and
sale of personal property used in operating the theater. Id.
65. The federal district court concluded that Pursue had standing to challenge
the statute since it had succeeded to the property interest against which the state
judgment was directed; it was conceded that Pursue could have appealed the state
judgment in the Ohio courts. 420 U.S. at 598 n.10.
66. Id. at 599. The court determined that the statute was overbroad insofar
as it prevented the showing of films not adjudged obscene in prior adversary hearings,
and therefore enjoined only that portion of the state judgment that closed the theater
to films not yet adjudged obscene.
67. Id. at 607. Since the district court did not treat the Younger issues, the
Supreme Court remanded for consideration of whether the facts fit within a
recognized exception to Younger. Id. at 611-13.
68. The Huffman Court noted two bases of the Younger doctrine: (1) the
serious threat to our federal system posed by federal interference with state proceedings, and (2) "the traditional reluctance of courts of equity, even within a
unitary system, to interfere with a criminal prosecution." Id. at 604. The Court
found the first Younger component equally applicable when state civil proceedings
were involved, since federal interference would prevent effectuation of substantive
state policies, inhibit the state from providing a forum adequate to vindicate constitutional challenges to those policies, require duplicative proceedings, and reflect
negatively on the ability of state courts to resolve constitutional issues. While the
second component normally would not apply to civil proceedings, the Huffman
Court concluded that the particular proceeding before it was "more akin to a
criminal prosecution than are most civil cases," since the state was a party and
the proceeding was "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes." Id.
69. "For the purposes of the case before us . . . we need make no general

pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation." Id. at 607.
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are limited to civil proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature that are designed
to enforce state interests normally embodied in criminal 70laws and, therefore, are functionally equivalent to criminal prosecutions.
Huffman did not merely extend the application of Younger to certain
pending civil proceedings. The federal complainant in Huffman chose not
to pursue an available state appellate remedy; the Court held that
"Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention in a state
judicial proceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his
state appellate remedies. '71 Thus, absent extraordinary circumstances
constituting an exception to Younger, federal equitable relief will not be
available if a state judgment has been issued and state appellate remedies
have not been exhausted.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas,
Justice Brennan criticized the Huffman decision for its apparent conflict
with the policies of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,72 the statute under which the
federal action was brought. 73 Justice Brennan noted that section 1983,
together with the Judiciary Act of 1875, was intended to make the federal
courts "primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given
70. The Huffman Court's extension of Younger to pending state quasi-criminal
proceedings is supported by traditional principles. Quasi-criminal state proceedings
attempt to effectuate interests and sanctions similar to those present in criminal
prosecutions. State interest in the administration of criminal laws has traditionally
been a factor in the effort to achieve comity in a federal system. Since quasicriminal state proceedings afford an adequate forum in which to raise constitutional
challenges to the statutes supporting the proceedings, established concepts of equity
support federal dismissal. See Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 122 (1975).
Yet where the pending state proceedings are solely civil in nature, the reasons
for applying Younger principles to curtail federal intervention are not as forceful. Cf.
Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974) (civil dependency proceedings).
State interest is diminished where criminal laws and the policies underlying them
are not involved, and equitable constraints on federal intervention are less significant.
The Younger balance appears to warrant federal relief: the state interest is less
substantial and procedural safeguards which prevent the initiation of frivolous or
meritless criminal prosecutions do not have their equivalents in civil proceedings,
yet the primary federal interest in vindicating constitutional rights remains. See 420
U.S. at 613-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc. v.
Silva Recio, 520 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1975) (pending state civil suit brought by
private individuals; Younger doctrine held inapplicable).
71. 420 U.S. at 609. The scope of the Huffman Court's language appears to
include situations involving state criminal prosecutions as well as the quasi-criminal
proceeding at issue in Huff-man. See id. at 608-09.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
73. 420 U.S. at 616-18.
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by the Constitution. ' 74 He therefore felt that to extend Younger to pending
state civil proceedings served to defeat the congressional objective of
section

1983. 7 5

Moreover, since Monroe v. Pape76 and its progeny

established that exhaustion of state administrative or judicial remedies
77
is not a prerequisite to bringing a federal action under section 1983,
Justice Brennan observed that to require exhaustion of state appellate
78
remedies in Huffman drastically undercut Monroe.
There is some basis for Justice Brennan's concern with the effect
of the Huffman holding upon the established duty of the federal courts to
protect and vindicate individual constitutional rights and the recognized
purpose of section 1983 to guarantee federal rights against state power
by interposing the federal courts as a buffer between the state and the
people. 79 The Huffman majority indicated that even when state appellate
remedies are no longer available to a party seeking federal relief under
section 1983, Younger principles would apply to preclude federal relief
absent extraordinary circumstances.8 0 Access to federal relief under sec74. Id. at 617, quoting from Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974).
For further discussion of the history of section 1983 see Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 245-49 (1967).
75. 420 U.S. at 616.
76. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
77. Id. at 183; McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963).
78. 420 U.S. at 617. The Huffman majority undertook to reconcile its holding
with the doctrine of non-exhaustion in section 1983 actions by focusing on the party
which had initiated, or would be required to initiate, the state action. Monroe held
that an individual need not initiate state proceedings before relief under section
1983 can be sought in federal court; Huffman requires deference to proceedings
already initiated by the state. Id. at 609-10 n.21; see text accompanying notes 139-41
infra.
79. See Mitchell v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-42 (1972). See also Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-65, 472-73 (1974); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668, 671-73 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
80. On two occasions in Huffman, Justice Rehnquist indicated that it does not
matter whether a state appellate remedy was still available at the time that the
federal relief was determined. Observing that the state judgment presumably became
final and non-appealable sometime between the federal filing and entry of the federal
district court judgment, he stated:
[R]egardless of when the [lower state court] judgment became final, we
believe that a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in appellee's
posture must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in
the District Court, unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions
specified in Younger.
420 U.S. at 608. Later, he repeated similar language:
While appellee had the option to appeal in state courts at the time it filed
this action, we do not know for certain whether such remedy remained available
at the time the District Court issued its permanent injunction, or whether it
remains available now. In any event, appellee may not avoid the standards of
Younger by simply failing to comply with the procedures of perfecting its appeal
within the Ohio judicial system.
Id. at 611 n.22.
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tion 1983 thus may be foreclosed.81 The impact of Huffman upon access
to a federal court for relief from a state statute challenged as unconstitutional
will vary, however, dependent upon the procedural posture of the litigation
involved.
If a party against whom judgment in a state court has been rendered
pursues a review of the decision in the highest court of the state, either
by appeal or through writ of certiorari,8 2 and the lower court judgment is
affirmed,8 review is then available in the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257.84 As long as the state court has decided in favor of the validity
of a state statute challenged on constitutional grounds, appeal is by right
under section 1257(2).8 5 Although the reality of such review is questionable since a large number of section 1257 appeals are disposed of by the
Court without argument,8 6 access to a federal court adjudication of the
81.

In Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975),

no appeal of the state order

declaring the film obscene and ordering its seizure was made. Justice White
observed:
It may be that under Huffman v. Pursue . . . the failure of appellees to

appeal the [state court] order . . . would itself foreclose resort to federal
court, absent extraordinary circumstances bringing the case within some
exception to Younger v. Harris.
422 U.S. at 351 n.20. In neither Hicks nor Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 435
(1975), did the Court reach this issue.
82. If no appellate remedy is available in the state system, the lower state court
judgment is reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. Thompson v. City
of Louisville, 362 US. 199 (1960); see WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 483.
83. A reversal of the lower court decision by a state appellate court will, of
course, make federal relief necessary.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970)

provides in relevant part:

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as
follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any
state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws

of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
An affirmance of a state prosecution or civil proceeding challenged on grounds that
the statute under which the proceedings were initiated is unconstitutional will, therefore, be appealable under section 1257(2).
85. Review by writ of certiorari is discretionary in nature. Sup. CT. R. 19.
86. See Douglas, The Suprme Court and Its Caseload, 45 CoRN. L.Q. 401
(1960); WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 493-94; Note, The Discretionary Power of the
Supreme Court to Dismiss Appeals from State Courts, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 688 (1963).
Justice Douglas cites statistics compiled for the years 1955-59 showing that the
Supreme Court actually heard argument in only 13% of the cases appealed from a
state court. Douglas, supra at 410. A large number of those appeals not actually
heard are affirmed or dismissed summarily for want of a substantial federal question.
See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Brown,
187 U.S. 308 (1902). See generally Ulman & Spears, "Dismissed for Want of a
Substantial Federal Question," 20 B.U.L. REv. 501 (1940); Note, The Insubstantial
Federal Question, 62 HARv. L. REv. 488 (1949).
The sufficiency of Supreme Court review as an alternative to a federal suit to
protect constitutional rights has been questioned by the Court itself. See England
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constitutional issues raised, a decision on the merits, appears assured.8 7
Federal habeas corpus relief will be available only if the state proceeding
resulted in custody of the defendant; where a criminal conviction has not
resulted in custody or, as in Huffman, where the state judgment is merely
quasi-criminal, access to a federal court through petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is unavailable. 8 s Whether the state proceeding was criminal
or civil, a federal suit under section 1983 seeking either an injunction
against enforcement or a declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality
of a state statute would seem precluded by traditional principles of res
judicata.8 9 Except for those occasions where federal habeas corpus is
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964); Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 617 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
87. Supreme Court dispositions of appeals from state courts are all decisions on
WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 495.
If the Supreme Court, either through appeal or by writ of certiorari, renders
a judgment on a prisoner's claim, that judgment is conclusive and federal habeas
corpus relief will not then be available. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "The writ of habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . ." The "custody" requirement of the federal habeas corpus statute has been broadened considerably by
the Supreme Court, and actual physical custody is no longer prerequisite to federal
habeas corpus relief. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (release
on one's own recognizance constitutes "custody"); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
(Kentucky's lodging of detainer against Alabama
Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)
prisoner puts prisoner in Kentucky "custody"); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234
(1968)
(unconditional release does not moot pending habeas corpus application);
(person released on parole is in
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963)
"custody").

the merits. See

If habeas corpus is available to challenge the validity of the fact or duration
of custody, it is the exclusive federal remedy for challenging the state statute under
which the conviction was achieved. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
A suit under section 1983 would be proper if damages were sought, however, since
neither the fact nor the duration of confinement would be challenged. Id. at 494.
89. The res judicata effect of a state court judgment upon a federal action
under section 1983 is not fully settled. The Supreme Court has not decided the
issue, although in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973) (dictum), the
Court observed that lower federal courts have held res judicata applicable to section
1983 actions. In Huffman res judicata was not raised in the district court, and was
thus not properly before the Court. 420 U.S. at 607-08 n.19. Justice Rehnquist
noted, however, that the Court was not suggesting "that the normal rules of res
judicata and judicial estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court proceedings." Id. at 606 n.18.
Numerous federal courts have held that collateral attack by federal section
1983 proceedings on a state conviction is barred by res judicata or collateral
estoppel. See, e.g., Chism v. Price, 457 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 1972) ; Coogan v.
Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209, 1211 (6th Cir. 1970); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334
F.2d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 1964); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1963);
Lathon v. Parish of Jefferson, 358 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1973); Mertes v. Mertes,
350 F. Supp. 472 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); cf. Huron Holding
(final state court
Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183 (1941)
judgment given full faith and credit in federal court); McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d
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available, 90 when state appellate remedies have been exhausted access
to federal relief from deprivations of individual constitutional rights is
limited to Supreme Court review.9 1 Whether an appeal as a matter of right
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)92 is sufficient to satisfy the federal courts' role
as primary vindicators of individual constitutional rights is arguable. But
any insufficiency lies in the nature of Supreme Court review and not in
denying federal court access under section 1983, because established principles of res judicata may apply to preclude relitigation in federal court of
federal issues already decided in state court proceedings between the same
parties. 93
1152 (2d Cir. 1975) (willingness of state courts to give their own decisions res
judicata effect is an important factor in determining whether federal court, in section
1983 action, should accord res judicata effect to state court decision); Prager v.
El Paso Nat'l Bank, 417 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1969) (state decision pending appeal
given res judicata effect in later federal action). The res judicata effect of a
state court judgment does not bar federal habeas corpus relief. See Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 456 (1953).
90. While the extension of Younger to quasi-criminal proceedings in Huffman
creates a further situation, in addition to criminal convictions not resulting in
"custody" of the defendant, in which Supreme Court review may be the only means
to federal relief, the broad availability of federal habeas corpus limits the impact
of this aspect of the Huffman decision upon access to federal relief. The concept
of "custody" for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief is now quite broad, see
note 88 supra, and few state proceedings are likely to fall within the category of
quasi-criminal.
91. Whether review by the highest state court in which a decision can be
rendered is by appeal or through writ of certiorari does not matter. If certiorari
is sought and denied by the state's highest court, appeal to the Supreme Court is
still available as a matter of right, see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert,
347 U.S. 157 (1954), and such review is subject to shortcomings similar to those
effecting appeals of right to the Supreme Court. See note 86 supra. Federal habeas
corpus is available only if the state prosecution has resulted in custody, see note 88
supra, and a federal action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief under section 1983
probably would be barred by res judicata. See note 89 supra.
92. See note 84 supra.
93. See note 89 supra.
In Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1093 (1974), a federal suit under section 1983 was held barred on principles
of collateral estoppel by an earlier state court conviction. The dissent objected that
the majority, without citation to any authority, had for the first time held that res
judicata or collateral estoppel applied to bar a challenge under section 1983 to the
constitutionality of a state law solely because the federal complainant had at one
time been convicted under the statute, despite the fact that the relief requested in
federal court was a declaration prohibiting future enforcement of the statute as
implemented by another statute. 497 F.2d at 343. If in fact a constitutional issue
could not have been raised in the state court proceeding, neither res judicata nor
collateral estoppel would preclude federal litigation of the claim. A federal suit seeking
relief from future prosecutions under a statute the constitutionality of which was
or could have been litigated in an earlier state prosecution of the same individual
would, however, appear to be barred.
If the equitable restraint doctrine of Younger and its progeny were viewed
as an abstention doctrine, res judicata would not bar relitigation of federal issues
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Different considerations are apposite if the losing state litigant has
failed to exhaust state appellate remedies which remain available. Supreme
Court review is not possible as there has not been a decision by the
highest state court able to render a decision. 94 Even if the state proceeding
has resulted in custody of the defendant, federal habeas corpus relief cannot be sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) since available state remedies
have not been exhausted. 95 With both Supreme Court review and federal
habeas corpus relief precluded, collateral attack of the state lower court
judgment under section 1983 would be the only remaining avenue to
federal relief. Huffman, however, requires federal dismissal in such a
setting, and holds that federal intervention in state proceedings when
state appellate remedies have not been exhausted is strictly limited to
96
circumstances satisfying one of the exceptions to Younger.
The Huffman requirement of exhaustion of state appellate remedies
appears sound when those remedies remain available to the losing litigant.
As noted by the Court, the states have a legitimate interest in overseeing
state court determinations of constitutional issues, a function which 9is7
effectuated by providing for appellate review of lower court decisions.
In the interest of comity, federal courts should allow state appellate courts
the opportunity to act without interference to correct state law or lower
in a federal section 1983 proceeding. The Court has held that a litigant is not
required, when a federal court abstains, to submit all federal issues for state court
adjudication; a reservation on the state record may be made which will preserve the
right to return to federal court for resolution of the federal claims. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1964). If a
reservation is not made, and the state court decides the federal claims, traditional
res judicata principles would bar federal relitigation of those issues. First Am.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 520 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1975).
94. If available, state court review must be sought before resort may be had
to Supreme Court review. Banks v. California, 395 U.S. 708 (1969) ; Gotthilf v. Sills,
375 U.S. 79 (1963). A purely formal appeal to a state appellate court has been
required even though rejection of such an appeal was predetermined. See Great
Western Tel. Co. v. Burnham, 162 U.S. 339 (1896). See generally WRIGHT, supra
note 19, at 482-83.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process
or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the prisoner.
96. 420 U.S. at 609. For a discussion of the recognized exceptions to Younger
see note 29 supra. By merely extending the application of Younger to circumstances
where a state judgment has been rendered but state appellate remedies have not
been exhausted, Huffman preserves intact the exceptions to Younger. Where bad
faith state prosecutions or other extraordinary circumstances are present, state interest
is lessened and the threat to individual rights is increased sufficiently to require federal
intervention in ongoing state proceedings, including the Huffman setting.
97. See 420 U.S. at 609.
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court interpretations of state law. 98

Once state appellate remedies have

been exhausted without success, federal court disposition of the constitutional issues would be available in the form of Supreme Court review,
or, if the state judgment resulted in custody, federal habeas corpus relief.
However, if state appellate remedies have not been pursued and are
no longer available, federal relief from state statutes challenged as unconstitutional may be permanently foreclosed under Huffman. Supreme Court
review is not available since there has not been a final judgment by the
highest state court in which a decision could be had.9 9 If the state court
action resulted in custody of the defendant, federal habeas corpus is
available under the doctrine that only those state remedies still open to
an applicant at the time he files his habeas corpus application in federal
court must be exhausted.100 Broad language in both Huffman and Hicks
appears to require federal equitable restraint under Younger where state
appellate remedies have not been pursued and are no longer available. 1 1
Under this language, federal relief through section 1983 proceedings would
not be possible, since the federal court would be required to dismiss the
action even though no state proceedings in which relief could be sought were
available. The state judgment would be final for state purposes, and section
1983 proceedings could not be initiated in federal court. 10 2 To the losing
98. Similar considerations form the basis of the Pullman abstention doctrine.
See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra. The exhaustion of available state
remedies requirement for federal habeas corpus is likewise based in notions of comity
and federalism, with a resultant desire to avoid conflict by showing a proper respect
for legitimate state functions and interests. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
490-91 (1973) ; Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963).
99. See WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 482.
The Supreme Court will "decline to review state court judgments which
rest on independent and adequate state grounds, even where these judgments also
decide federal questions." Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965) ; see
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1875). Whether failure to pursue a timely appear to a state appellate
court is an adequate state ground which will preclude Supreme Court review is
uncertain. The Court has distinguished between state substantive and state procedural
grounds, holding that to prevent review, a state procedural ground must serve a
legitimate state interest. See Henry v. Mississippi, supra at 447-48. State procedural
rules requiring reasonably timely applications for state court review would appear
to serve legitimate state purposes and, therefore, preclude Supreme Court review.
100. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504, 516 (1972). The holding in Fay v. Noia is qualified to the extent that habeas
corpus relief may also be denied to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed state
remedies. 372 U.S. at 438-40.
101. See notes 80-81 supra.
102. Res judicata would seem to preclude relitigation of the federal issue since
the state decision is a final judgment. The applicability of res judicata in these circumstances is not yet certain, however, although lower federal courts have often
held res judicata or collateral estoppel to bar relitigation under a section 1983 action.
See note 89 supra.
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state civil litigant or criminal defendant not in custody, no means to federal
relief from a state statute challenged as unconstitutional would be open.
Hicks

T4NDER THE

Younger

BALANCE

The extension of Younger in Hicks can be examined in light of the
Younger balance. Factors pertinent to this balance include the state interest in administration of state laws, the pendency of a state proceeding
furnishing an adequate legal remedy, the possibility that federal intervention
would reflect negatively on state court capabilities, considerations of
judicial economy, the duty of a federal court to vindicate individual constitutional rights, the effect of a delay in relief upon the individual rights
at stake, the particular federal right imperiled, and the gravity of the
threat to it. While this list attempts to enumerate all the factors relevant
in Hicks, the nature of the Younger balancing process makes it impossible
to identify all factors which conceivably might arise in other settings.
The extent of a state's interest in the administration and enforcement
of its criminal laws may vary with the particular state statute and state
proceeding involved. While significant state interest in the enforcement of
state criminal laws has traditionally been acknowledged, 03 state interest
in purely civil laws and proceedings may be considerably less. 10 4 The
Huffman Court recognized that state interest in a civil proceeding "in
aid of and closely related to criminal statutes" is essentially equivalent to
state interest in a criminal prosecution. 105 In such a quasi-criminal state
proceeding, the state is the party which initiates the action, as in a
criminal prosecution, and the policies embodied in the pertinent statute
are similar to those which support state criminal laws. 10 6 State interest
in the administration and enforcement of state laws, while varying with the
type of state statute and proceeding involved, does not vary merely because a federal suit is commenced prior to the initiation of a state prosecution. The state interest at stake in Hicks therefore would appear to be
of such significance as to suggest that dismissal of the federal suit would
be justified.
Once a state prosecution is initiated, there is a pending state proceeding which furnishes an adequate forum for resolution of the constitutional issues raised. 10 7 If, however, a state proceeding has not been
103. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971); Spielman Motor
Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44
(1926).
104. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 614-15 (1975) (dissenting
opinion).
105. 420 U.S. at 604.
106. See id. at 604-05.
107. The state forum is adequate only so long as none of the extraordinary
circumstances constituting exceptions to Younger are present. See Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
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commenced, there is no adequate state remedy at law.' 0 8 In the Hicks
setting, the pending state prosecution furnished an adequate remedy, thus
favoring federal deference to the state court under Younger.
In Steffel v. Thompson'1 9 the Court noted that absent a pending
state prosecution, federal intervention would not be interpreted as reflecting
negatively on the ability of a state to uphold constitutional principles." 0
By implication, the possibility of such negative reflection should be weighed
as a factor in the Younger balance, supporting dismissal of the federal
suit where to proceed would reflect negatively, and supporting the completion of the federal action where it would not. Where, as in Hicks,
the federal suit was filed before the state proceeding began, the likelihood
that completion of the federal action would be interpreted as disparaging
the abilities of the state court is less than if the state proceeding were
commenced first, but greater than if there were no state forum at all,
as in Steffel.
When both a federal and a state proceeding are ongoing, considerations
of judicial economy and the desire to avoid unnecessary duplication of
litigation are pertinent factors in the Younger balance."' However, in
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc." 2 the Supreme Court stated that there will

inevitably be duplication and overlapping of judicial activities in a federal
system that is comprised of distinct judicial systems, each of which is
charged with interpreting the United States Constitution."
The Salem
Inn Court decided that the propriety of federal relief for each individual
federal plaintiff should be determined independently of facts that would
govern relief for other plaintiffs, concluding that notions of federalism
embodied in Younger outweighed interests in efficient judicial administration. 1 4 In Hicks, where continuing the federal action after the state
proceeding has been commenced might result in duplicative proceedings,
considerations of judicial economy favor dismissal of the federal action.
Thus, what little viability remains to the factor of judicial economy after
108. Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943).
109. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
110. Id. at 462.
111. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
112. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
113. Id. at 928.
114. Id. The Court stated that both "the interest of avoiding conflicting outcomes in the litigation of similar issues" and "the interest in conservation of judicial
manpower" must be subordinated to considerations of federalism. Therefore, Younger
would require denial of one plaintiff's request for federal relief, while it would not
preclude federal relief for co-plaintiffs not faced with pending state prosecutions.
Considerations of judicial economy are a vital element of the Supreme
Court's test for whether a trial court, in its discretion, should refuse to hear a
pendent state claim after the federal claim on which federal jurisdiction is based has
been dismissed. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966);
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-05 (1970).
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Salem Inn tends, in the Hicks circumstance, to support the application of
Younger.
As noted by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Hicks," 5 the federalism
portrayed in Younger requires "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments."" 6 The federal duty to vindicate
individual constitutional rights i 7 and the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
traditionally has been observed as providing a federal remedy supplementary to any state remedy" 8 reflect the significant federal interests at
stake. The dissenting Justices in Hicks felt that the majority holding
ousted the federal courts from their historic place as protectors of constitutional freedoms, and that permitting state interference with this
legitimate federal interest was an offense to federalism." 9 The duty of
federal courts to protect individual constitutional rights clearly supports
not restricting federal intervention in state proceedings.
The dissenting Justices in Hicks also expressed their fear that in
holding Younger applicable where a state prosecution was initiated after
commencement of the federal suit, the majority was permitting state
prosecutorial officials to usurp federal jurisdiction at any time merely by
initiating state proceedings.' 20 Although this argument has a certain
appeal, two considerations should undercut any problem which might
exist. Continued use of careful balancing of interests under Younger will
result in retention of the federal action where federal and individual interests outweigh those of the state, especially where proceedings of substance
on the merits have transpired in federal court prior to initiation of the
state prosecution. Moreover, where the state proceedings have been commenced without expectation of conviction, the Younger doctrine would not
12 1
apply because of "bad faith" on the part of state officials.
An additional consideration in the Younger balance is the effect of
delay in relief upon the individual rights threatened. Younger held that the
chilling effect accompanying an unconstitutional state statute did not, by
itself, support federal intervention in pending state prosecutions. 2 2 The
result of the Hicks holding may be to delay eventual relief, thus prolonging
any chilling effect upon the individual rights at stake. This possible increase
115. 422 U.S. at 353.
116. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).

117. F.

FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,

THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:

A STUDY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928); see Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) ; Zwickler v.Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967).
118. See, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
119. 422 U.S. at 356-57.
120. "Today's opinion virtually instructs state officials to answer federal complaints with state indictments." 422 U.S. at 357 (dissenting opinion).
121. See note 23 supra.
122. 401 U.S. at 53.
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in chilling effect is a factor in the Younger balance which favors federal
intervention.

123

Consideration of all factors relevant to effectuation of this balance
leads to the conclusion that Younger properly applies in the Hicks setting
to preclude federal relief. The high state interest in administration of the
criminal statute in Hicks and the existence of a pending state prosecution
furnishing an adequate remedy under state law are factors which swing the
Younger balance in favor of dismissal of the federal action. However,
the impact of Hicks should not be extended beyond the factual setting
there involved. Cases may arise where, upon consideration of all pertinent
factors, Hicks should not require dismissal of the federal action despite the
absence of federal proceedings of substance on the merits. Since the
intensity of state interest in the administration and enforcement of state
l2 4
laws is dependent upon the type of state statute and proceeding involved,
in certain situations the state interest may have less of an impact upon the
Younger balance. State interest in a local ordinance might be of less
significance to the Younger balance than the interest in a statute having
state-wide effect. Huffman held that the state interest in enforcement of
state policies through civil proceedings closely related to criminal statutes
125
is roughly equivalent to the state interest in a criminal prosecution.
But state interest in purely civil laws would seem to be considerably less
than the traditionally recognized state interest in the administration of
state criminal laws, 126 and even the state interest in a state-wide criminal
statute might vary depending upon the seriousness of the activity the statute
is intended to regulate. Thus, a quasi-criminal proceeding brought to
enforce a local ordinance proscribing allegedly protected activity of minimal
significance to the state might not involve a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to require, under a Younger, balancing process, dismissal of
a federal action in the Hicks procedural posture.
The federal interests at stake may also vary. 127 The specific individual
constitutional rights imperiled and the seriousness of the threat to them
may determine how important it is that a federal court fulfill its duty
to protect those rights by exercising its power to intervene in state proceedings. 128 The additional delay and expense to a federal plaintiff result123. Another factor might be the additional expense an individual would incur
if forced to terminate a federal action in which considerable resources had been
expended and then to defend a state action from the beginning.
124. See notes 103-06 and accompanying text supra.
125. 420 U.S. at 604.
126. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 614-15 (1975) (dissenting
opinion). Younger has not yet been applied by the Supreme Court where purely
civil laws having little relation to criminal standards are involved. See note 70 supra.
127. The extent of the federal interests at stake must be determined as of the
time the state prosecution is initiated. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 354
(1975) (dissenting opinion).
128. While the federal interest in protecting an individual complainant's threatened
constitutional rights may be substantial, the same interest might not be present if
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ing from dismissal of the federal action after considerable time and effort
have been expended, and subsequent defense of a state proceeding from
the start, may also favor continuance of the federal action even if the
Hicks standard of federal proceedings of substance on the merits has not
been met.
Proper exercise of the duty of a federal court faced with a request for
intervention in state proceedings should thus continue to require a careful
weighing of all relevant interests in order to determine whether the
principles of the Younger doctrine actually necessitate dismissal of the
federal suit. The fact that no proceedings of substance on the merits have
taken place in federal court should not compel federal dismissal when no
exception to Younger is present. Nor should the fact that such proceedings
have transpired prior to commencement of the state suit relieve the federal
court of its obligation to consider carefully all pertinent factors to determine
whether the Younger balance nonetheless requires dismissal of the federal
action. Hicks should not be read as setting down a strict line, with cases
falling on one side requiring, and cases on the other precluding, federal
dismissal. Analysis under the weighing process of Younger and its progeny
should continue to be the applicable test.
Huffman

AND THE DOCTRINE OF

Monroe v. Pape

Continued use of a test employing careful scrutiny and weighing of the
specific state and federal interests at stake would also help to preserve the
recognized purpose of section 1983:
The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's
federal rights - to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under color of state29law, "whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial."'
In Monroe v. Pape130 and McNeese v. Board of Education,13' the Supreme
Court established the doctrine that in actions brought in federal court under
section 1983 there is no requirement that the complainant first exhaust
state administrative or judicial remedies: "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked.' u3 2 Thus, an individual may
seek federal relief under section 1983 without first resorting to available
state remedies.
the litigation were being pursued actively by an interest group rather than by the

individual facing the state proceedings.
129. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), quoting from Ex porte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).
130. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
131. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
132. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) ; see McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 617 (1975)
(dissenting opinion).
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There is an apparent conflict between the Monroe non-exhaustion
doctrine and the Younger doctrine. 133 In effect, the Younger line of cases
creates a substantial "exception" to the non-exhaustion doctrine. So long
as no state proceeding has been commenced, Monroe, in combination with
Steffel v. Thompson 34 and Doran v. Salem Inn, inc.,1 3 5 permits a federal
court to hear the merits of a claim made under section 1983 and grant
appropriate relief.' 3 6 However, when a state proceeding has been commenced prior to the federal suit, the Younger doctrine requires a party
to litigate his constitutional claims in the state court proceedings rather
than in the federal action under section 1983. Hicks extends Younger
so that dismissal of the federal action is also required in some instances
when the federal suit was commenced prior to the state proceedings. 37
And Huffman makes an additional impact on the Monroe non-exhaustion
doctrine by holding that Younger also requires that relief be sought
in state rather than federal court when a losing state litigant has not
exhausted state appellate remedies. 138
The majority in Huffman attempted to reconcile its holding with the
doctrine of Monroe. Justice Rehnquist observed that while Monroe held
that one suing under section 1983 "need not first initiate state proceedings,"
the exhaustion of appellate remedies requirement in Huffman concerned
"the deference to be accorded state proceedings which have already been
initiated."'13 9 This reconciliation is supported by the specific language of
Monroe, which -held that a state remedy "need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked."' 140 The Younger cases involve
situations where the state has initiated proceedings against the federal
complainant, and Justice Rehnquist's distinction appears sound in that
circumstance. Hicks properly should be interpreted simply as a refinement
of Younger, with careful weighing of state and federal interests still determining whether federal dismissal is warranted; thus Hicks does not
133. Cf. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (interrelationship of Monroe
non-exhaustion and abstention).
134. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
135. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
136. Steffel permitted federal declaratory relief from a threatened state prosecution and Salem Inn affirmed a district court discretionary grant of a preliminary
injunction in the absence of a pending state prosecution. Although the Court has not
as yet decided whether permanent federal injunctive relief from threatened state
prosecutions is permitted under the Steffel-Salem Inn reasoning, see note 43 supra,
a request for such relief may be heard by a federal court; if the challenge to the
state statute is successful, declaratory rather than the more coercive injunctive
remedy will normally be sufficient to assure proper relief. See Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
137. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
138. 420 U.S. at 609. Huffman makes a further impact upon the Monroe rule
by extending the application of Younger to quasi-criminal as well as criminal proceedings.
139. 420 U.S. at 609-10 n.21.
140. 365 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added).
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represent a significant erosion of the Monroe rule since it is encompassed
in the Younger exception to non-exhaustion. The effect of Huffman upon
non-exhaustion is less easily explained by Justice Rehnquist's reconciliation,
since the Court's holding actually requires the losing state litigant, who
is also the federal complainant, to initiate a state proceeding by seeking
appellate review.
It is questionable whether consideration of who initiates a state proceeding should be the determining factor in deciding whether relief must
be sought in state court or is available in a federal suit under section 1983.
More properly, this factor is but one of a variety of considerations under a
Younger balancing process. Justice Rehnquist's explanation in Huffman
does demonstrate the consistency of the Monroe and Younger doctrines.
The traditional balancing of state and federal interests under Younger
should remain, however, the essential test for determining the propriety
of federal relief from state proceedings, regardless of whether the state
action was commenced before federal relief was sought, and regardless of
whether the state proceeding is in a trial or appellate posture.' 41
141. The Supreme Court may clarify the relationship between the Younger doctrine
and that of Monroe v. Pape when it decides McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct 264 (1975). One of the issues presented is whether
a state prisoner must exhaust adequate state administrative remedies before bringing a
federal action under section 1983 challenging the conditions of his confinement. See
44 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975); Comment, The Maryland Inmate Grievance
Commission or the Federal Courtsf A Problem of Exhaustion, 35 MD. L. REV. 458
(1975). An indication by the Court that available and adequate state administrative
remedies must be exhausted before an action under section 1983 can be brought in
federal court would not significantly undermine Younger. It is almost inconceivable
that the Court will establish an unqualified doctrine requiring exhaustion of adequate
state administrative and judicial remedies. Monroe forecloses the issue of exhaustion of
state judicial remedies and is a well-accepted doctrine. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 609-10 n.21 (1975). Requiring exhaustion of judicial remedies might preclude federal declaratory relief from a threatened state prosecution, as was sought in
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), because an available state declaratory
remedy would have to be pursued first. A requirement that state judicial remedies
be exhausted in a section 1983 suit would be inconsistent with traditional notions of
the roles of the federal courts and section 1983 in vindicating individual constitutional
rights. See notes 74-75 and 117-18 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, a
balancing of interests under Younger should remain the proper test for determining
the propriety of federal equitable intervention in state criminal or quasi-criminal
proceedings. See Comment, The Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, supra,

at 469-71.
There are sound arguments for distinguishing between exhaustion of state
administrative and judicial remedies. The potential res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect of a state court judgment means that an exhaustion of judicial remedies
requirement would seriously restrict access to federal relief under section 1983 suits.
Cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baron v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134
(1914) ; Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983
Cases, 41 U. Cmi. L. REV. 537, 551 n.68 (1974) ; notes 89, 93, and 101-02 and accompanying text supra. An administrative agency charged with resolving particular disputes will develop an expertise in that area which is unattainable by federal or
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CONCLUSION

In both Huffman and Hicks the Supreme Court held that Younger
principles must be considered by a federal court deciding whether to intervene in state court proceedings, thus making federal relief unavailable
absent extraordinary circumstances even when the federal action was
commenced prior to initiation of the state proceeding or where a lower
state court judgment had already been rendered. Viewed under the
Younger doctrine, these decisions appear properly to effectuate the balance
of interests which Younger requires. Well-considered application of the
Younger balance continues as the necessary test, and lower federal courts
should determine and weigh carefully the various state and federal interests
involved. Mechanical application of the language of the Court in Hicks
should not take the place of analysis.
The Huffman Court attempted to reconcile its holding that Younger
applied to restrict federal equitable relief when state appellate remedies
have not been exhausted with the doctrine of Monroe v. Pape and the role
of federal courts as vindicators of individual constitutional rights through
section 1983 proceedings. While this reconciliation, based on who must
initiate the state proceeding, appears sound in the Hicks setting, some
problems remain. Huffman requires a federal complainant to initiate state
appellate proceedings, a position seemingly inconsistent with the Monroe
rule. More fundamentally, consideration of who initiates the state proceeding should not be conclusive in deciding the propriety of federal
equitable relief. Determinations in this area continue to require careful
weighing of all factors pertinent to the Younger balance rather than
mechanical application of isolated considerations.
state courts; the benefit to be derived from deference to such expertise by requiring
exhaustion of adequate administrative remedies seems a valid consideration in the
balance. See Comment, The Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, supra, at 471-72.
In McCray the Court might formulate a qualified requirement that adequate state
administrative remedies be exhausted, limiting it to actions by state prisoners because
of the special state interests involved. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92
(1973) ("It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger
interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and
procedures, than the administration of its prisons.").

